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The Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Tax Base of 16
March 2011 (the Proposal) effectively contains a European Corporate Tax system
and a European Tax Base. Although I do not agree with some of the choices that
were made in drafting the Proposal, I congratulate the CCCTB Working Group
with the result. They clearly have invested an enormous amount of (thinking) work
in this Proposal. In this chapter, I will focus on the general principles and char-
acteristics of the Tax Base part of the proposal.
The Proposal lists some ‘General Principles’ as such (for instance, Articles 9
and 17), but a number of characteristics is not specifically mentioned. In this
chapter I will give attention to both categories. After that I will look more closely
into a number of concrete possible problem issues.
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
Looking at the Proposal, specifically at the articles concerning the Tax Base
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6), a few general characteristics can be discerned:
– The Proposal is based on a profit and loss account approach.
Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB: Selected Issues, pp. 67–77.
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– As mentioned in the introduction the Proposal contains both rules
concerning the Tax Base as well as (basic) rules for a Corporate Income
Tax.
– The relationship between the Directive itself and the Delegated Acts: main
rules in the Directive, details in Delegated Acts.
– The Proposal has an independent concept of profit.
– There is no fall back system for issues not regulated in the Proposal.
3. PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT APPROACH
In the Proposal the calculation of the Tax Base has taken the form of a profit and
loss account (P&L) approach (Article 10) as opposed to a balance sheet approach.
This is in a sense not a fundamental choice, the P&L approach can also lead to a
balance sheet. If, for instance, the depreciation cost are calculated for the P&L
approach, this must also lead (somewhere) to a tax book value of the assets. There
might however be possible problems with this approach as was mentioned during
the ACTL seminar of June 10 and 11 in Amsterdam. For instance, whether the
waiver of a loan should constitute income for the debtor is solved automatically in a
balance sheet approach, but needs a separate rule (stating such a waiver is income)
in a P&L approach.
A P&L approach seems to be the more obvious approach1 for a jurisdiction in
which the calculation of the profit for tax purposes is linked to the commercial
accounts of the company.2 In this Proposal however the choice was made for an
independent concept of profit, therefore, the choice for a P&L approach is not
obvious.
4. TAX BASE AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX
In many European Member States the Tax Base and Corporate Income Tax are
situated in different laws. This is most obvious in Member States where the cal-
culation of the Tax Base is linked to the commercial accounts. In the Netherlands,
there is no such formal link, but still the Tax Base is not situated in the Corporate
Income Tax Act. The choice to incorporate both matters in the Proposal has made it
both voluminous as well as difficult to split. If there is no (political) possibility for a
complete Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), there might still
be room for a Common Corporate Tax Base. In that case, the proposal would have
to be split up.
1. See The determination of Corporate Taxable Income in the EU Member States edited by Endress,
Oestreicher, Scheffler, Spengel, Kluwer Law International, 2007, p. 25.
2. For more information on ‘linking’ see P. Essers and R. Russo, The influence of IAS/IFRS on the
CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Disclosure, and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, p. 31–37.
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However, the challenge (for the CCCTB Working Group) is to go for a
CCCTB and not to prepare for a CCTB as a second best. I understand the
choice for an all encompassing proposal, but I also wonder if more flexibility
(two separate proposals) would have been prudent. It certainly would have
been more in line with current Tax Law Practice in most Member States.
5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELEGATED
ACTS AND THE DIRECTIVE
It is difficult to get unanimous approval of all Member States so that a draft
proposal may become a Directive. The Commission is faced with the dilemma
of what to regulate in the Directive itself (the main issues) and what to leave to the
Delegated Acts. Through Delegated Acts the Commission can act more swiftly and
decisively to settle more detailed issues, mainly because unanimity is not required
in the decision process. In the ‘whereas clauses’, nr 24, the Commission asks to be
empowered to adopt Delegated Acts for an indeterminate time.
The scope of the Delegated Acts (for the Tax Base) is limited to what is
mentioned in aforementioned nr 24: list of non-deductible taxes, rules on definition
of legal and economic ownership in relation to leased assets, the calculation of the
capital and interest elements of leasing payments and the depreciation base of a
leased asset.
The rules in the Delegated Acts are mainly concerned with leasing and, there-
fore, will have a limited impact. For leasing the Delegated Acts will probably act as
safe have rules so parties involved in a leasing agreement will be able to determine
simply who may depreciate the asset involved.
Other issues can apparently not be covered by Delegated Acts, which is prob-
ably a lost opportunity for the Commission to control the development of the
content of the Directive. Strange in this respect is Article 42 on the basis of
which the Commission may adopt Delegated Acts on defining categories of
fixed assets as this is not mentioned in the aforementioned nr 24.
I will come back to the issue of Delegated Acts in sections 6 and 7.
6. INDEPENDENT CONCEPT OF PROFIT/NO FALL
BACK SYSTEM
In drafting the Proposal the CCCTB Working Group was presented with the
problem how to regulate the calculation of profit for the CCCTB. Apparently it
was not an option to link the Tax Base to the commercial profit. Although the
commercial profit has to some extent been harmonised within the EU, this was not
an easy process. At this moment listed companies must present their consolidated
commercial accounts on the basis of the International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRS). There is no such obligation for the single accounts, a major reason
being that many Member States use the single accounts as a starting point for the
CCCTB: General Principles and Characteristics
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tax accounts. Member States clearly had resistance to the IASB in some way (co)
determining the tax base.
This resistance has had its influence on the Proposal (and its predecessors).
The IFRS were first a starting point, but later in the process of forming the Proposal
they were not mentioned at all. In the actual articles of the Proposal and its pre-
decessors IFRS could and can be seen clearly. As Thomas Neale stated in his
paper,3 IFRS was the common language for the members of the CCCTB WG
and so materially has found its way in the Proposal, although formally there is
no relationship.
So there is no formal link between the CCCTB concept of profit and the
commercial accounts, IFRS or (any) national GAAP. The CCCTB profit is an
independent concept and as such new and unique. The problem is then how to
give this new concept the substance it needs so it can be used in practice by tax
payers and tax authorities (and Courts if these parties disagree).
In general, two methods exist to create substance for a concept of profit:
– list some principles and leave the creation of substance to case law and/or
standards (drafted by representatives of stakeholders and subject to case
law);
– section incorporate a detailed set of rules in the legislation.
In the Proposal the choice is mixed: there are a few general principles and many
concrete rules (but not detailed enough to solve all issues, see section 6.2).
The substance of the CCCTB profit can further be created by case law (for the
issues not or insufficiently regulated), but this might present difficulties. Disagree-
ments between tax payers and tax authorities must be judged primarily by the
Courts in the Member State of the principal tax payer. It will be difficult to
keep track of the decisions of these Courts in 27 Member States and even more
difficult to integrate them into a workable system, especially as I expect there will
be (many) contradictory verdicts. The Proposal does not provide for a back up
system for issues not regulated, so each Court will view the CCCTB within its own
domestic background and these backgrounds will influence their decisions.
I will view the general principles and some of the concrete rules in the Pro-
posal separately.
6.1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The general principles of the Tax Base mentioned in the proposal are:
(a) Profits and losses shall be recognised only when realised (Articles 9).
(b) Transactions and taxable events shall be measured individually
(Article 9).
3. Thomas Neale in: CCCTB: how far have we got and what are the next steps, s. 2.1, Common
Consolidated Tax Base (Lang, Pistone, Schuch, Staringer), Series on international tax law 53,
Linde Verlag Wien, 2008.
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(c) The calculation of the tax base must be consistent unless exceptional
circumstances justify a change (Article 9).
(d) The tax base shall be determined for each tax year, unless otherwise
provided and be any 12-month period unless otherwise provided
(Article 9).
(e) Revenues, expenses and deductible items shall be recognised in the tax
year in which they accrue or are incurred, unless otherwise provided
(Articles 17, 18, 19).
(f) Related parties and shareholders must be dealt with on an at arms’ length
basis (Articles 15 and 79).
General principles that I miss are the principles of continuity, prudence, simplicity
and substance over form. The continuity principle presupposes that the company
will continue its business (going concern, see the IASB Framework, section 23).
For instance, in valuation matters usually not the liquidation value, but the going
concern value must be applied. As I do not think that the CCCTB WG does not
agree with this principle, the reason for this omission is not clear to me.
The prudence principle4 is known in many tax jurisdictions and commercial
accounting (see the IASB Framework, section 37), but as such not mentioned in the
Proposal. A number of rules based on this principle have however been incorpo-
rated in the Proposal (for instance, Article 25 (provisions), Article 27 (bad debt
deductions), Article 29, section 4 (stock valuation at the lower of cost and net
realisable value) Article 41 (exceptional depreciation). Apparently the CCCTB
WG in this particular case has chosen a rule based approach in stead of a principle
based approach.
On the basis of the simplicity principle companies are in some cases allowed to
deviate from the rigid demands of accrual and realisation. As the size and com-
plexity of the company play an important role in the application of this principle
and CCCTB is primarily meant for international companies, I understand that the
CCCTB WG has chosen not to incorporate this principle. In some cases however
the simplicity principle can be called upon by Tax Authorities.5 Apparently for
CCCTB this is not the intention. Substance over form, like the others, is also to be
found in the IASB Framework (section 35) and many tax systems.6 The reason not
to incorporate this principle is perhaps that potentially is could be interpreted very
widely (by tax authorities) and so would make the CCCTB unattractive for
companies.
Most of the other general principles listed are to be expected in any Tax Base
(B, D, F). Still the CCCTB WG has made some choices where other choices were
possible or perhaps desirable.
4. See The determination of Corporate Taxable Income in the EU Member States edited by Endress,
Oestreicher, Scheffler, Spengel, Kluwer Law International, 2007, p. 27.
5. For an example see HR 28 January 2011, BNB 2011/85.
6. See The determination of Corporate Taxable Income in the EU Member States edited by Endress,
Oestreicher, Scheffler, Spengel, Kluwer Law International, 2007, p. 29.
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Under A it is stated that profits and losses shall be recognised only when
realised. Clearly this is a compromise as many Member States allow losses to
be recognised when they occur without having to be realised.7 In some specific
cases it is possible to recognise a loss without realisation, but in the system of the
Proposal a specific article is required (for instance Article 29, section 4). It will
be interesting to see how Courts those have to decide issues not foreseen in the
Proposal will react, especially if their domestic tax law rules are more flexible on
this point.
Under C it is stated that the calculation of the Tax Base must be consistent
unless exceptional circumstances justify a change. Again it will be interesting to see
how Courts will apply this rule. In the domestic tax law rules of the Netherlands, a
similar rule applies. The Supreme Court (HR 14 June 1978, BNB 1979/181) has
ruled that a system may be changed at any time as long as the main reason for the
change is not to obtain an incidental tax advantage. To obtain a structural tax
advantage is permitted. It is not unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule the
same for the CCCTB. I wonder if the CCCTB WG had this in mind when they
drafted the Proposal.
Under E the accrual principle is listed and in itself this is no surprise. Most
systems of calculating commercial and tax profit are based on this principle
(see the IASB Framework, section 22). Usually however expenses and deductible
items are also ruled by this principle. If. for instance a company would rent a
building for two years and would pay the rent (for these two years) at the start
of the renting period, the cost would have to be spread over the two relevant years,
not just the year of payment. I do not think the CCCTB WG had anything else in
mind, but the use of the term ‘incurred’ for cost (and the explanation of this term in
Article 19) can create uncertainty on this issue.
6.2. CONCRETE RULES
As mentioned under 6.1, the Proposal contains many concrete rules, but they do
not cover all eventualities. Although I believe it is theoretically impossible to
capture all (future) possibilities in detailed rules, the Proposal already shows issues
not covered, as I will try to demonstrate in this section. I will focus on some
possible problem areas but this is by no means a complete list.
6.2.1. Roll Over Relief (Article 38)
In general, depreciation in the Proposal is regulated through a pooling system,
except for individually depreciable assets (Article 36: buildings, other long life
tangible assets, intangible assets). If an individually depreciable asset is disposed
7. On the basis of the prudence principle, see The determination of Corporate Taxable Income in
the EU Member States, edited by Endress, Oestreicher, Scheffler, Spengel, Kluwer Law
International, 2007, p. 27/28.
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of and the proceeds exceed the tax book value, this profit is liable to taxation. There
is one exception: if the proceeds are re-invested in an asset used for the same or a
similar purpose, the profit may be ‘rolled over’ to the replacement asset. The book
value of the replacement asset must be reduced by the profit that was ‘rolled over’.
In this way the profit is taxed ultimately because there is less depreciation on the
replacement asset.
In the Netherlands there is a similar system and there is a vast amount of case
law to fill in the details that cannot be found in the relevant tax law article.
Article 38 of the Proposal also does not contain many of these details so case
law is to be expected. Some issues that can lead to many a dispute between com-
panies and tax authorities are:
– What is a similar purpose? Can a building that is rented out be replaced by
any other rented building or must the buildings have more similarities (for
instance: must they both be in the same field of business or is it possible to
replace an apartment block by an industrial hall). The Supreme Court in the
Netherlands has ruled that practically any rented out building may be
replaced by any other rented out building (HR 10 March 2006, V-N
2006/15.17).
– What happens if the profit to be ‘rolled over’ exceeds the tax book value of
the replacement asset? Is it possible to create an asset with a tax book value
of nil or even a negative book value? In the Netherlands this is not possible
to because of the phrasing in the relevant article (Article 8 Corporate
Income tax Act and Article 3.54 Personal Income Tax Act), but the Proposal
is silent on this subject.
– What is the exact moment of disposal or re-investment? Is it the moment a
contract has been concluded or the moment of transfer of legal ownership
(these moments can differ substantially in the case of buildings). These
moments become relevant in determining whether the two year term in
Article 38 has either started or terminated. In the Netherlands the contract
moment is decisive, not the moment of transfer of legal ownership.
– Can re-investment take place by a group member in another Member State?
– Can re-investment take place in an asset located in another Member State or
in a third country? The article does not limit re-investment to the Member
State in which the profit was realised and Article 31 (transfer of assets
towards a third country) does not mention roll over relief so I think it is
possible.
– If the disposal of the asset gives rise to costs, do these costs reduce the
amount to be ‘rolled over’? If this is the case how must companies deter-
mine which cost are to be taken into account? In the Netherlands cost must
be taken into account if they are directly attributable to the disposal (HR
6 June 2008, BNB 2008/223). As there is no case law yet on what ‘directly
attributable’ exactly is, more case law is expected.
– What exactly will constitute an involuntary disposal? If an asset is disposed
of because this is absolutely necessary from a business point of view, a
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company might view this as an involuntary disposal. The relevant tax
authority might only view a calamity (for instance when a building is
destroyed by fire and the insurance pay out exceeds the tax book value)
as involuntary.
With the examples above, I have effectively compared some practical implications
of the Netherlands system with the system of the Proposal. My point is that in cases
of disputes between companies and tax authorities, the Netherlands Courts will
probably tend to settle these disputes along the lines of the Netherlands national tax
law, especially since this system is similar to that of the Proposal and the Proposal
offers no fall back possibility. I do not know how the Courts in other Member
States will rule in these cases, but I would be surprised if they would all come to the
same conclusions.
6.2.2. Hedge Accounting (Article 28)
The general rule in the Proposal is (see 6.1. B) that transactions and events will be
measured individually. This is a general principle of commercial and tax account-
ing since joint measurement in general obstructs a clear view on the relevant
transactions (see IAS 1). An exception to this rule is possible: if transactions
are meant to be taken into account together because fluctuation in their values
shows a more or less opposite effect (jointly therefore an effect of more or less nil).
This is hedge accounting or joint valuation.
Commercially, companies tend to create hedges to mitigate risks on prices,
interests or currencies. For the calculation of the commercial profit they are
inclined to follow the hedges. Usually this leads to the fact that a loss on a financial
instrument is not taken into account because it is offset against the (possibly)
unrealised gain on another asset. Commercial standards as IFRS (IAS 39 in this
case) tend to allow hedge accounting if strict conditions are met.
For the calculation of the profit for tax purposes companies tend not to be too
keen on hedge accounting. It often can give them the opportunity to present a loss
on a financial instrument where they do not have to present the corresponding
profit yet because it has not been realised yet.
In the Netherlands, the Supreme Court (HR 23 January 2004, BNB 2004/214,
HR 16 November 2007, NTFR 2007/2072) has ruled that hedge accounting can be
mandatory even in cases where the conditions for commercial hedge accounting
are not met. Of course this is only possible in a system where there is no formal link
between the commercial accounts and the tax accounts, such as the Proposal (and
the Netherlands).
Article 28 seems to be a very short rendering of IAS 39 and so sets conditions
that were meant for calculating the commercial profit. The main condition in this
respect is that the hedging relationship must be formally designated and documen-
ted in advance. Companies might use this condition to escape having to apply
hedging by, for instance, not formally designating the hedge. I do not know if
the CCCTB WG intended this outcome.
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6.2.3. Stock versus Material Fixed Assets
The valuation of stocks and material fixed assets is different in many ways. Usually
it is not so difficult to distinguish between the two categories, but in the case of
buildings it can present problems. In case law in the Netherlands, this problem
focuses on the application of (the Netherlands version of) roll over relief. Roll over
relief is only possible for individually depreciable assets (material fixed assets) and
not for stocks. For a company that invests in buildings with the intention of selling
them, the buildings effectively represent stocks, even if it takes a lot longer than
usual to make the actual sale. In cases of profit on the disposal of buildings the
difference between the two categories of assets becomes important if the company
wishes to apply roll over relief.
In the Netherlands, there is extensive case law on this matter, in which the
intention of the (board of the) company is decisive. If the intention is sale, it is
stock, if not it is a material fixed asset. In the Proposal the CCCTB WG has tried to
deal with this problem by inserting a minimum term of ownership in the article
about roll over relief (Article 28, paragraph 1, last sentence). If an asset is disposed
of voluntarily, roll over relief is only applicable if the company has owned the asset
for three years. The idea is probably that this minimum period covers assets held
for sale. In real estate however this does not have to be the case. Furthermore the
minimum is only applicable in cases of voluntary disposal. I believe that the
problem is there and will be a source of potential disagreement between companies
and tax authorities.
6.2.4. Provisions
Provisions are regulated in Article 25 of the Proposal. Generally, it follows the
usual requirements for a provision in commercial accounts (see IAS 37). In one
obvious matter the Proposal deviates from commercial provisions: constructive
obligations. A constructive obligation is an obligation that derives from actions
where by an established pattern of past practice, published policies or a sufficiently
specific current statement a company has indicated to other parties it will accept
certain responsibilities and it has created a valid expectation on the part of those
other parties that it will discharge those responsibilities (IAS 37.10). Under the
proposal it is not possible to form a provision for these obligations. A legal obli-
gation is required. This restriction to legal obligations was also present in WP 57
(the outline to the Proposal in 2007) and criticised.8 The CCCTB WG is apparently
worried that commercial rules on provisions are less conservative than tax rules
should be and therefore has limited the possibility of forming provisions to cases of
legal obligations. I do not believe that this worry is justified, given the fact that
contingent liabilities are not recognised under IAS 37 (they only have to be dis-
closed but have no effect on the balance sheet). A contingent liability is a possible
8. See P. Essers and R. Russo, The influence of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Dis-
closure, and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, p. 71–77.
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obligation that arises from past events and whose existence will be confirmed only
by the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more future events not wholly in the
control of the company (IAS 37.28).
Another reason to exclude constructive obligations is probably that it is easier
for tax administrations to check the requirements for legal obligations than con-
structive obligations.
There is ample scope for disagreements between companies and tax author-
ities and therefore creation of case law to decide in specific cases whether or not the
demands for a provision under the text of Article 25 of the Proposal have been met
(for instance: when exactly does a legal obligation qualify, can the future event
reasonably be expected to occur, when is a future benefit directly linked).
7. NO FALL BACK SYSTEM
The Proposal is based on a limited number of general principles and characteristics
and contains detailed regulations on the various subjects. As I have tried to point
out in this chapter the regulations leave a lot of room for interpretation. Some of the
uncertainties can be remedied by regulating further in Delegated Acts, although the
Proposal seems to limit the issues for which Delegated Acts are possible.
The possibility of successfully using Delegated Acts will depend on how fast
the Commission can agree upon and then implement them.
In this chapter I have listed several issues that are unclear and liable to dis-
cussion between companies and tax authorities. If a Court is called upon to settle
such a dispute, it has only the text of the Proposal to base its decision upon.
The Proposal offers no frame of reference to any set of rules or standards to
give the Court some direction in the process of deciding. I assume that the Courts
in each Member State will use the frame of reference they are accustomed to. As
the tax systems all differ, chances are Courts in different Member States will come
to very different decisions on the basis of the same facts (the European Court of
Justice will eventually coordinate, but this will take a long time). I find this an
undesirable effect, not only from a theoretical point of view (the law should be the
same for every one), but also from a commercial point of view. Companies will be
uncertain as to the extent of their tax liability and might prefer domestic tax law.
In my opinion9 the CCCTB should provide for a fall back system for issues not
regulated in the Proposal. The Courts could use this system (instead of all using
their domestic system) as they settle disputes. The number of disputes will be
considerably lower because companies and tax authorities will not have to go to
Court on issues provided for in the fall back system. The creation of such a fall back
system is not an easy matter so I suggest to make use of what is already there.
Commercial Standards (such as IAS/IFRS) already exist. They could be used for
the creation of CCCTB Standards. The Commission (or a council of all relevant
9. See P. Essers and R. Russo, The influence of IAS/IFRS on the CCCTB, Tax Accounting, Dis-
closure, and Corporate Law Accounting Concepts, p. 44–52.
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stakeholders: companies and tax authorities) could filter or adapt the standards for
CCCTB use (an endorsement committee is already in place to asses the IAS/IFRS
for the commercial accounts). For a more detailed approach to a possible EU Tax
Accounting Standards Board I refer to the previous footnote.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Tax Base in the proposal can be characterised by a profit and loss account
approach and the fact that it introduces an independent concept of profit. This
concept of profit has been given substance by a few general principles and
many concrete rules. There is no fall back system for issues that are not or insuf-
ficiently regulated by the Proposal. In this chapter I have demonstrated that there
are many such issues, on which tax authorities and companies can (and will) have
different points of view. These differences will have to be solved by creating case
law. This case law is to be formed by Courts in all 27 Member States, who will all
use their own frames of reference to decide the issues that are brought before them.
They have no real choice in the matter as the Proposal does not offer such a frame
of reference.
I have both theoretical and commercial objections to this set up. From a
theoretical point of view the Proposal should have the same meaning and effect
in each Member State (which is practically impossible in the current form). From a
commercial point of view companies might not be eager to choose CCCTB if that
means that they have to put up with uncertainties in their tax liability.
The concept of profit in the Proposal should in my view be given substance by
adopting Tax Accounting Standards. IAS/IFRS could be used as a starting point, a
board consisting of (for instance) representatives of tax authorities and companies
could filter or adapt standards for tax use. This system will not rule out the need for
a deciding authority, for instance in cases where the Board cannot reach a decision
or if a company feels a standard is a violation of the Proposal, but the occasions to
go to Court will be less numerous. Tax Accounting Standards will not solve all
problems and it is certainly not an easy solution, but I feel it is preferable to the
Proposal in its current form.
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